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Abstract: Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that 
issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corpora-
tions were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review 
committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. 
The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to 
supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate gover-
nance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure 
as espoused by Hart [1995]. 
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. approach to corporate governance is being chal-
lenged due to corporate failures in the early part of this decade 
and the more recent decline in markets and the trading value of 
corporate equity securities. These recent episodes have raised 
public concern over corporate behavior in many areas such as 
compensation, performance measurement, and accountability. 
While these corporate failures have diverse consequences 
and details, the conditions which enabled them can be related 
to corporate governance failures. Evidence and theory avail-
able to the investor show that managerial discretion combined 
with other incentives can cause managers to pursue personal 
interests at the expense of the investor. In their discussion of 
Acknowledgments: We express our appreciation to the anonymous review-
ers and the editor, Richard Fleischman, for their comments and suggestions which 
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corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny [1997] try to answer 
the question of why investors part with their money in the face 
of potential managerial misuse of the investment. Currently, 
investors theoretically control management. In the 19th century, 
stockholders were directly involved in the corporation and es-
tablished governance procedures and policies for the protection 
of their investments.
Hart [1995] provides a theoretical framework for corpo-
rate governance, describing the problem of incomplete agent 
contracts and how corporate governance relates. Hart proposes 
that if the agency problem exists and contracts are incomplete, 
then the structure of corporate governance has a role and is 
 important. Five issues of corporate governance raised by Hart 
are: cost of agent contracts; individual stockholders are too 
numerous to exercise control on a day-to-day basis; large stock-
holders; limitations of the corporate board of directors; and 
the potential that management will pursue its own goals at the 
stockholders’ expense. Resulting from these issues, providers 
of capital have designed systems of corporate governance with 
checks and balances to protect their financial interests in the 
corporation. 
With methods of corporate governance and the success of 
those methods today being questioned, this paper reviews cor-
porate governance from an historical perspective. While several 
studies [Roe, 1993; Charkham, 1994] have compared corporate 
governance methods between countries, few have looked at cor-
porate governance in history [Gallhofer and Haslam, 1993]. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Over the past several years, the structure of our corporate 
governance system has come into question. At Enron, the board 
of directors removed governance controls, allowing the CFO to 
operate off-balance-sheet partnerships that greatly obscured 
the true financial condition of the company. At Adelphia, the 
president ignored the economic entity assumption and used the 
assets of the company as his own. Before these companies fal-
tered, some academics were already questioning our corporate 
governance system. Hart [1995] and Shleifer and Vishny [1997] 
published papers presenting evidence that there are flaws in the 
corporate governance system upon which investors rely. Both of 
these papers state the limitations of the corporate governance 
system and potential problems associated with those limita-
tions. Issues mentioned in both papers include agency problems 
and large stockholders. 
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As previously indicated, Hart proposed a framework of 
corporate governance, maintaining that the market approach 
to monitoring corporate governance theoretically should create 
a good system of corporate governance that would work in all 
cases. Hart argues that a market view should not need a statu-
tory corporate governance structure, but that the limitations of 
the market are not correcting all corporate governance issues. 
As an example, he regards the historical separation of chief 
executive and board chairman as a non-issue. However, one in-
dividual holding the position of both CEO and board chairman 
at a company can provide sufficient power to base business deci-
sions on personal incentives. The recent failures of the market 
approach to corporate governance have led to statutory gover-
nance  policies in the form of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Shleifer and Vishny [1997] in their discussion of corporate 
governance make the observation that in lesser developed coun-
tries corporate governance is almost nonexistent. Undeveloped 
countries today have the advantage of the ability to observe and 
emulate the best practices of the developed world. By choosing 
the best practices of each country, these countries can create 
systems that are as good, if not better, than the systems currently 
used in the economically developed world. 
However, what can be said about the origins of corporate 
governance? The earliest companies did not have the advantage 
of others to emulate. Using historical examples, we can review 
the development of our current corporate governance structures 
and obtain additional insights into these systems. This paper 
provides evidence that many of the current issues of corporate 
governance existed in 19th century corporations. The paper 
further illustrates how the issues raised by Hart are not new but 
have been related to corporate governance since the first cor-
porations chartered in the U.S. by providing evidence from the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O). The paper also 
presents information about how the C&O addressed these issues 
of corporate governance. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
On September 2, 1784, George Washington started a tour of 
the western territories. Washington had large land holdings in 
western Virginia, and the purpose of his trip was to examine his 
land holdings, collect some money due him from tenants, and 
other business dealings. Upon his return to Virginia, Washington 
wrote a letter to Benjamin Harrison, governor of Virginia, on 
October 10, 1784. In this letter, he noted that unless the colonies 
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improved communication and trade with the western territories, 
the loyalty of the people settling these territories would switch to 
Spanish New Orleans. Washington suggested in this letter1 that 
a method that could be used to improve communications was 
to improve waterways between the coastal region of the country 
and the Ohio Valley. Governor Harrison presented Washington’s 
letter to the state legislature during that session. The legislature 
granted Washington a corporate charter. 
The corporation formed was the Potomac Company (PC). 
Over the next three months, Washington worked to obtain a 
similar charter from the State of Maryland. The PC was a river 
improvement company and, as such, removed obstructions from 
the river and built canals circumventing major falls. The PC had 
exhausted its finances by 1820 with few improvements to show 
for the expenditures of time and money. The navigational im-
provements undertaken by the PC proved to be inadequate for 
the region and needs of the country. 
During the War of 1812, communications and transporta-
tion needs became very apparent in the states. The State of 
New York started construction of the Erie Canal in 1817 [Shaw 
1966]. Once again, the Potomac route to the west was seen as a 
commercial route. In 1823, a new group of individuals obtained 
a charter from Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the fed-
eral government to form a new company. The new company, the 
C&O, absorbed the assets, liabilities, and stockholders of the 
PC. The goal of the new company was to build an artificial river 
(canal) from tidewater Potomac to the Ohio River at Pittsburgh. 
On July 4, 1828, the company broke ground in Georgetown (now 
part of the District of Columbia) and commenced construction 
paralleling the north bank of the Potomac River. 
Congress appropriated funds for the Army Corps of Engi-
neers to survey the route and prepare an estimate of construc-
tion for the canal in the amount of $22 million. The canal 
promoters believed that this sum was far too great an amount 
for the company to raise for construction. The canal promoters 
secured a new estimate that predicted the canal could be built 
for $4.5 million. The canal promoters accepted the lower num-
ber and proceeded with construction. Twenty-two years (1828-
1 From the sending of this letter, the canal movement in the U.S. was born. 
Individuals promoting the C&O and the Erie Canals [Shaw, 1966], as well as other 
canal promoters, quote the letter from Washington to Harrison. The letter pre-
sents Washington’s fears that without communication and trade, the western ter-
ritories could become Spanish by virtue of trading with Spanish New Orleans.
4
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9
117Russ et al., The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company
1850) and $18 million later, the company reached Cumberland, 
Maryland. The distance from Georgetown to Cumberland was 
184.5 miles. This distance was less than half the original route 
planned to the Ohio River. Lack of funds for continued construc-
tion and the location of coal fields in the Cumberland area as a 
source of revenue convinced company management to stop at 
Cumberland. 
Despite the fact that the C&O was never sufficiently profit-
able to pay off its corporate debt borrowed for construction and 
repairs, the company was able to survive for over one hundred 
years (including the predecessor PC). Although the canal did en-
joy financial success during the 1870s and early 1880s, it was in-
sufficient to pay off the corporate debt or to provide a return to 
the stockholders. During this time, the company administrators 
were successful in waging a political war2 with the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad (B&O) [Dilts, 1993]. Severe flooding in 1877 
and 1889 caused major damage to the canal works. After the 
1889 flood, funding was not available to make repairs, and the 
C&O was forced into receivership. 
Subsequently, the B&O emerged as the majority owner of 
the repair bonds, holding the mortgage on the canal, and as-
sumed control of the company. Funding provided by the B&O 
allowed the canal to be repaired and returned to service in 1892; 
however, another flood in 1924 resulted in the canal’s permanent 
closure. In 1938, the federal government purchased the canal 
assets from the B&O for $2 million [Sanderlin, 1946], and, in 
1971, the canal was designated a national park. 
At the time the federal government purchased the C&O 
canal assets (1938), the available corporate records were also 
transferred to the government and now reside at the National 
Archives in the suburbs of Washington. Included among these 
records were the Board of Director’s minute books and the 
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers to the Capital Stock 
of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, referred to in this 
paper as the stockholder minute books. Financial statements 
were presented annually to the stockholders of the C&O during 
the period 1829-1889, with the number of copies produced rang-
ing from 250 to 1,000 annually. However, the annual reports for 
2 The B&O and the C&O were both politically active. Both companies were 
attempting to gain favors in the Maryland State Legislature. The companies in 
their early histories were trying to obtain construction financing while later issues 
involved other advantages, such as rate changes. (Company toll rates were set by 
the legislature.) 
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only five of these years reside in the National Archives. Copies of 
the printed annual financial statements for all years except 1857, 
1869, and 1888 were obtained from six sources (see Appendix 1). 
The C&O, while never profitable for the individual inves-
tors, was economically valuable for the region it served. Ransom 
[1964] argued that economic historians have focused on the 
railroad as the most important factor in American economic 
growth. He concluded that this emphasis is misguided and that 
since canal construction in the U.S. predated the railroads, their 
contribution to American economic growth should be re-eval-
uated. Ransom further states that canals never constituted an 
integrated system and that their economic contributions should 
be evaluated individually. 
ACTIONS BY STOCKHOLDERS TO EFFECT CONTROL
The 1784 charter of the PC required an annual meeting of 
the stockholders. The charter also included wording that at the 
annual meeting the “president and directors shall make report, 
and render distinct and just accounts of all their proceedings, 
and on finding them fairly and justly stated, the proprietors then 
present, or a majority of them, shall give a certificate thereof” 
[Virginia Act, 1784, ch. XLIII]. To accomplish this charter re-
quirement at each annual meeting, the stockholders of the PC 
selected a committee of stockholders to review the annual report 
of the company. At the time of the founding of the PC, there 
were no corporations to emulate. The origin of the concept of 
using the review committee remains unknown. However, the 
Middlesex Canal Company also used the stockholders to per-
form the review function [Roberts, 1938]. 
The charter of the C&O was almost identical to that of 
the PC, including the above referenced phrase. In addition to 
absorbing the stockholders of the PC, the C&O also inherited 
many PC practices, including the corporate governance struc-
ture. The C&O continued to have a committee review the annual 
report presented by the company president and report back to 
the stockholders on their findings. A separate sub-committee 
was created to review (audit) the annual financial statements 
presented to the stockholders. 
At the 1831 annual stockholders meeting, a resolution was 
passed to create the stockholder review committee at the cur-
rent meeting to review next year’s annual report. The resolution 
also states that the president and directors should have the 
annual report prepared two weeks prior to the annual meeting 
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to allow the committee to review the report before the stock-
holders meeting. After completing the canal to Cumberland, 
Maryland in 1850, the review process was again modified. A 
committee of three or four stockholders present at the current 
stockholders meeting would be selected to review the next year’s 
annual report, replacing the committee/sub-committee struc-
ture previously employed. The committee’s main focus during 
these years was the examination of the financial records of the 
company. Additionally, other committees would be established 
as the stockholders felt necessary to examine particular issues of 
interest to the stockholders.3 The annual review committee re-
ports presented in the stockholder minute books provide insight 
into the functionality of the company’s corporate governance 
structure.
WEAKNESSES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Hart [1995] explained the weaknesses and importance of 
corporate governance structures. He discussed the five weak-
nesses in corporate governance structures identified in the intro-
duction and provided a theoretical framework for these weak-
nesses. The following discussion describes these five weaknesses 
and how they are illustrated by the C&O in operation.
The Cost of Agent Contracts: The costs and complexity of writing 
a comprehensive agent contract are such that organizations will 
only write incomplete contracts [Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 
1997]. Shleifer and Vishny describe the incomplete contract 
issue with regards to the allocation of company funds. They re-
mark that ideally a company would write a contract that speci-
fies exactly how a manager would allocate company funding of 
projects, but future contingencies are impossible to foresee or 
describe. Hart [1995] argues that the potential costs of contracts 
are thinking of every potential eventuality, the cost of negotiat-
ing contracts, and the cost of writing the contract so that it is 
enforceable. In the case of the C&O, it was not possible to think 
of every possible contingency since its stockholders were enter-
ing an unknown area. The C&O did not even have a written 
contract with the corporate president. Company presidents were 
elected annually at the stockholders meetings, so there were no 
negotiations. The method of enforcing the stockholders’ will on 
the company presidents was by replacing them at the next stock-
3 An example is the committee established in 1869 to investigate the option of 
turning over control of the company to the bondholders. 
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holders meeting. 
The stockholders imposed controls on the company man-
agement by passing stockholder resolutions. As illustrated by the 
changes occurring during the tenure of Arthur Gorman’s presi-
dency. Gorman was president of the C&O from 1873 to 1883. 
During his tenure, a corporate bondholder, Daniel K. Stewart, 
brought a lawsuit against the company for non-payment of bond 
interest. In this 1881 lawsuit [Stewart v. Chesapeake and Ohio 
Canal and others], the plaintiff alleged corporate mismanage-
ment as the reason for the non-payment. The court, while not 
agreeing to place the company into receivership as requested 
by the plaintiff, did agree that the company was spending ex-
travagantly on travel and entertainment expenses. In 1879, the 
stockholders had passed a resolution limiting the travel reim-
bursement expenses of the officers and directors of the company. 
Following the lawsuit, the stockholders further limited expendi-
tures at the 1881 stockholder meeting. The stockholders passed 
a resolution that all salaries would be fixed by them and that the 
company would pay no expenses for travel or hotel bills [C&O, 
1856-1889, p. 332].
Hart [1995, p. 680] further states that the “governance struc-
ture can be seen as a mechanism for making decisions that have 
not been specified in the initial contract.” While the stockholder 
review committee did not identify the issue of excessive travel 
and entertainment expenses, the stockholders of the C&O acted 
to correct the issue of travel and entertainment expenses by set-
ting limits on the amount of expenditure allowable.
Individual Stockholders are too Numerous to Effect Individual 
Control: The authors of the C&O charter attempted to protect 
small investors by including voting restrictions. These restric-
tions were one vote per share for the first ten shares held and 
one vote per every five shares above ten. It was felt that at $100 
par, no one individual or organization would be able to gain 
control of the enterprise. However, in 1836, the State of Mary-
land purchased enough shares of stock to control over 50% of 
the voting rights [Sanderlin, 1946]. Thereafter, each change in 
the political party controlling the Maryland statehouse brought 
a change in the company president and the Board of Directors. 
In 1825, Maryland created a Board of Public Works. The 
original purpose of the board was to oversee state investments 
in corporations and to locate additional opportunities for invest-
ment as the state set out to provide income for governmental 
operations without direct taxation. In 1850, Maryland created a 
8
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new Board of Public Works whose job was simply to represent 
the state at stockholder meetings, not to exercise direct manage-
rial control over its various investments [Wilner, 1984]. 
In 1850, Maryland held a constitutional convention, and 
the oversight of the various state corporate investments was 
an area of significant debate. Mr. Thomas, the representative 
from Frederick County, commented that there was a significant 
difference between Maryland and other states with respect to 
its canal investments. The difference was that the internal im-
provements companies in other states were owned, built, and 
operated by the states as non-profit entities. Canals in New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio were all public enterprises. Mr. Smith of 
Allegheny County said that the state had no duty other than to 
attend the annual meeting and cast the state’s vote. He further 
said that the state could have no supervision over the works as 
the charter gives entire control to the president and directors of 
the company [Wilner, 1984]. The Maryland legislature intended 
the company to be independently controlled, but the intent of 
the state legislature did not prevent the Board of Public Works 
from making political appointments to the company presidency. 
In spite of concerns about management weakness caused by 
political appointments, the C&O continued operating indepen-
dently until 1889, when it was finally placed into receivership. 
In 1841, the stockholders, recognizing the costs of continu-
ous changes in company management, passed a resolution that 
the C&O was a national work and should not become a political 
engine, fluctuating with the vagaries of Maryland’s statehouse 
politics [C&O, 1836-1841, p. 414]. By the 1870s, the offices of the 
company had become political perks bestowed by the political 
party in charge. Arthur Gorman was appointed president 1873 
as a reward for services rendered the Democratic Party [Sand-
erlin, 1947]. In the year Gorman was nominated as president of 
the company, Maryland cast its votes for Gorman with all other 
stockholder votes against. Hart [1995] explains that when com-
pany management is sufficiently bad, dissident shareholders can 
initiate a proxy fight to remove the board, but that this course of 
action is usually ineffective. In the case of the C&O, it was im-
possible for the minority stockholders to bring about change. 
The minority stockholders also made attempts to gain more 
influence in the company. The individual representing the stock 
held by the U.S. government presented a motion to change the 
method for electing members of the Board of Directors at the 
June 1879 annual meeting. The proposal was for the Board of 
Directors to consist of three members elected by Maryland and 
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two members elected by the minority stockholders. The resolu-
tion was defeated because Maryland voted against the resolution 
although all other stockholders voted for it. 
Corporate bondholders also recognized the limitations occa-
sioned by the political nature of the company. In 1881, the bond-
holders presented a petition at the stockholders meeting noting 
that they had not received any payment since December 1876. 
The petition further explained that if the company were run as 
a business and free of political influences, the company would 
have been able to pay the debt [C&O, 1856-1889, pp. 336-337].
O’Sullivan [2000, p. 410], commenting on innovative organi -
zations and corporate governance, argued that “a system of 
corporate governance supports innovation by generating three 
conditions – financial commitment, organizational integration 
and insider control.” Financial commitment is defined as an 
institution’s resolve to continue financial support of innovation. 
Organizational integration is the maintenance of human capi-
tal. Once an innovative process has started, the loss of human 
capital will cost the organization additional resources. Insider 
control requires that decision makers are involved in the learn-
ing/innovation process. The stockholders of the C&O were upset 
by the problems of continuously changing company officers. 
Subsequent to Maryland gaining control of the company, the 
minority stockholders were unable to exert enough control to 
force a change in policy. At the April 1841 stockholders meeting, 
the review committee made the following statement to protest 
the turnover of officers as a function of Maryland politics [C&O, 
1836-1841, pp. 417-418]:
The committee, from evidence given them, are satis-
fied that very valuable and faithful officers have been 
removed from the service of the company, and, in some 
cases, men not competent to perform the duties re-
quired have been appointed in their places, to the seri-
ous injury of the best interest of the company. 
 Some of these removals have been as admitted by 
the president’s report to the governor of Maryland, for 
political opinions sake which, as your committee con-
ceive, no direct interest of the company either required 
or demanded. 
 In addition to these views already presented, there 
are other matters which might be adverted to if the time 
allowed for this report would permit, which go strongly 
to induce this committee to believe that the affairs of 
the canal company have been most unfortunately man-
aged.
10
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The stockholders of the C&O were numerous with large 
blocks of stock held by the U.S. government, the State of Vir-
ginia, and the cities of Alexandria and Georgetown. Even with 
these large blocks of stock, the holders working together were 
still unable to affect changes in corporate management when it 
was deemed necessary.
Large Stockholders: In the presence of large shareholders, agency 
problems may be reduced but not eliminated. Shareholders with 
over 10% of the outstanding stock of a company have more in-
centive to monitor company management. A substantial minor-
ity shareholder has enough voting control to put pressure on or 
even remove management [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. A current 
example would be the California retirement system (CALPERS) 
that picks a few companies each year to contact about corporate 
changes. Unfortunately, CALPERS is the exception not the rule. 
Most large-block holders are free riders and do not monitor 
company management. 
Large shareholders will under-perform the monitoring 
and intervention activities and may use their voting power to 
improve their own position at the expense of the other share-
holders [Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. One reason 
identified by Hart for the under-performance of large stockhold-
ers includes their using their voting power to improve their own 
position at the expense of the company. Also, large stockholders 
can be persuaded not to confront management in exchange for a 
promise to have their shares repurchased at a premium (green-
mail). Hart mentioned one additional problem with large stock-
holders that more clearly relates to the C&O. The problem is 
that a large institutional shareholder must hire a representative 
to act on its behalf. As stated above, Maryland controlled more 
than 50% of the stockholder voting rights. However, aside from 
selecting company management each year, the state maintained 
a laissez faire attitude toward the operations of the company. 
Information regarding a large stockholder working for rea-
sons of self-interest was also illustrated by the C&O. In 1841, the 
Maryland legislature passed a bill to provide additional funding 
requested by the company for completion of the canal. Before 
the funding was made available to the company, the stock holders 
had to ratify the provisions of the bill. When the resolution was 
presented for a vote at the stockholders meeting, Maryland 
voted for the resolution with all other stockholders against. The 
bill thus passed included a clause that the other stockholders 
found objectionable. This section contained wording requesting 
11
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that the state’s attorney general begin proceedings against the 
company for failure to pay interest on previously loaned money. 
Since the previous loan included a mortgage of corporate as-
sets, the stockholders were afraid that the state would foreclose 
on the company and leave them with nothing. The state ended 
up lending the company the money without taking legal action 
to collect amounts past due. Maryland used its voting power 
to further its own agenda. Politicians of the state also used the 
company to further personal political ambitions and agendas as 
indicated in the previous section of the paper. 
Maryland held ownership control but did not exert it day-
to-day. Rather, it limited its role to appointing members of the 
Board of Directors each year. At a constitutional convention, the 
delegates considered taking operational control of the company, 
but in the discussion of this issue, the delegates indicated that 
this was beyond the scope of state government [Wilner, 1984].
Limitations of the Corporate Board of Directors: Stockholders 
elect a board of directors to monitor corporate management. 
In his discussion of a board of directors, Hart [1995] lists four 
shortcomings of the board as a monitoring device. The first limi-
tation is that some board members are corporate officers and 
that self-monitoring is not effective. The C&O did not have cor-
porate officers as board members so there is no illustrative evi-
dence of this issue present. The second limitation is that board 
members may not have a financial interest in the company and 
therefore have little to gain by the success of the company. In the 
beginning, the C&O board was populated by stockholders. All of 
these individuals had a vested financial interest in the success of 
the company. After Maryland acquired voting control in 1836, 
board members were selected by the state for more political rea-
sons. Most of these individuals had no financial interest in the 
company. The third limitation is that board members are busy 
persons and have little time for company business affairs. In the 
1800s when travel was more time consuming and difficult than 
today, this problem was a greater issue. The board members 
were paid a salary and travel expenses (limited in 1879), but 
these were political gentlemen more interested in political than 
financial gains. The last limitation is that directors may owe 
their positions to company management and may be more loyal 
to management than to the stockholders they are to protect. In 
the case of the C&O, the directors and the company president 
were political appointees, selected as much for their political 
party association as for their business savvy. These individu-
12
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als owed their allegiance to the president far more than to the 
stockholders. 
In the second half of the 19th century, the members of the 
C&O Board of Directors were all political appointees. None of 
the board members held company stock and, thus, had nothing 
to gain personally from company success. The only gain they 
would receive was political. All of these issues, in the case of the 
C&O, led to the company having a Board of Directors with little 
to gain by the company’s success. It is apparent from archival 
evidence that President Gorman used the company to further 
his own political future. Gorman hired persons and chose con-
tractors to gain favor with the individuals he needed in the fu-
ture to reach higher political office [Lambert, 1953]. After eight 
years as president of the C&O, Gorman was elected to the U.S. 
Senate, representing the State of Maryland. The Board of Direc-
tors owed their allegiance to the political party more than to the 
C&O. For this reason, one could conclude that the board did not 
monitor the actions of the company president as closely as per-
haps they should have. Without close monitoring by the board of 
directors, company management is free to pursue its own goals. 
The following section provides a discussion of this topic and the 
consequences that resulted in the case of the C&O. 
Potential that Management will Pursue its Own Goals: As stated 
earlier, President Gorman used his office to further his political 
ambitions. Further evidence is demonstrated by the fact that 
many board meetings during his tenure were held in Baltimore, 
the home of the B&O, the C&O’s chief competitor. The B&O 
was a rival for funding, route, and customers. Gorman spent 
 company money on travel, hotels, and entertainment for himself 
and C&O board members to have its board meetings in Balti-
more. Gorman was not a Baltimorean, the C&O offices were in 
Annapolis, and the City of Baltimore and its residents provided 
little, if any, support for the canal. However, Baltimore was the 
center of political power in Maryland. 
Existing evidence indicates that Gorman used the C&O to 
further his personal ambitions. In 1880, the C&O was sued by a 
holder of mortgage bonds. The lawsuit [1881] alleged that Gor-
man was using his position as president to further his political 
ambition at the expense of the bondholders. The suit alleged 
that Gorman had political agents on the company payroll and 
employed numerous “worthless” persons to further his political 
ambitions [Lambert, 1953]. 
The corporate governance issues presented by Hart [1995] 
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existed in a 19th century corporation. C&O stockholders identi-
fied and addressed these corporate governance issues. It is mani-
festly clear that agency problem existed. 
Hart argued that in the presence of agency problems and 
incomplete contracts, corporate governance matters greatly. 
Therefore corporate governance would be vital at the C&O 
since the company did not have a contract with the corporate 
president and severe agency problems existed. The next sec-
tion of this paper discusses how the C&O shareholders used a 
stockholder review committee to force corporate officers and 
directors to address the problems presented by the limitations 
on corporate governance.
STOCKHOLDER AUDIT 
As mentioned previously, the C&O annually created a com-
mittee of stockholders to review the annual report of the presi-
dent and directors. The Middlesex Canal of Massachusetts4 also 
used stockholders to perform the audit function [Kistler, 1980]. 
In her article on the Middlesex Canal, Kistler revealed that the 
stockholders of that company appeared to have reviewed all 
transactions. However, she also noted that the review performed 
in 1830 was completed in only one week and commented that it 
is doubtful that much work could have been performed in such 
a short period of time, leaving doubt as to the thoroughness of 
the audit. The archive of the Middlesex Canal Company does not 
provide any additional information about the these audit efforts. 
The C&O review committee left more detailed information 
regarding the thoroughness of its audit efforts. The C&O com-
mittee recognized the limitations of auditing. In 1838, the com-
mittee reviewing the annual report made the statement that it 
could not review all transactions in the time period allowed, but 
that this did not seem necessary since the board had approved 
all requisitions for payment. Therefore, the committee reviewed 
the requisitions issued for disbursements, examined the books 
of the treasurer and company clerk, and found these to be satis-
factory [C&O, 1836-1841, pp. 176-177].
For the year 1839, the committee, in making comments 
about estimated figures on the financial statements, made this 
further observation [C&O, 1836-1841, p. 291]:
4 The Middlesex Canal was a contemporary company of the C&O. The Middle-
sex was founded in 1793 and had a similar corporate governance structure. 
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From these causes the statements may be found to 
require some variation but although not exact, the sub-
committee are induced to believe, that they are at least 
proximately correct in the available basis that they ex-
hibit for the demands of the current year.
This limited endorsement did not keep the sub-committee from 
admonishing the company officers when irregularities were en-
countered. 
Over the life of the C&O, the stockholders reviewing the 
company finances made numerous observations and recom-
mendations. The first recommendations for change came in 
1834, when the review committee requested four changes in the 
manner in which the company kept records and reported to the 
stockholders. The first request was that requisitions for salaries 
and services state the time period for which the recipient was 
receiving pay and the capacity in which the person had served 
the company. The second request was that changes be made 
regarding the presentation of financial statements. Previously, 
for instance, the treasurer’s report consisted of one statement 
showing total receipts and expenditures to date for the company. 
The recommendation of the committee was to present a sepa-
rate column for the current-year information. The review com-
mittee also requested that expenses for repairs be accounted for 
and reported separately from expenses for canal construction. 
Finally, it requested that a statement showing the volume of 
goods transported on the canal be presented [C&O, 1828-1835, 
pp. 361-362].
In 1839, the committee observed that the clerk’s statement 
showed other receipts in the amount of $11,175.58 arising from 
such things as tolls, rents, etc. collected by the several superin-
tendents that had been subsequently used and accounted for in 
the service of the company. Consequently, these receipts had not 
passed through the books of the treasurer [C&O, 1836-1841, p. 
289]. The review committee asked that this process be termi-
nated and that all receipts and expenditures be passed through 
(entered into) the treasurer’s books. The committee commented 
that the practice of allowing superintendents to spend money 
without an accounting of the money in the company records 
“seems irregular and inconvenient.” 
Two stockholders meetings were held in 1841. At the April 
meeting, the stockholder review committee admonished the 
company, claiming that the statement of debts and credits of 
the company presented by the president to the stockholders was 
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incorrect and could not be relied upon. The committee then 
observed that it was unable to present any satisfactory view on 
the financial statements [C&O, 1836-1841, pp. 415-416]. The 
committee further claimed that the company bylaws required 
that the company treasurer present financial reports at each 
monthly board meeting and that this reporting had not been 
done since the current treasurer had been in office. The commit-
tee made several statements regarding individual transactions 
such as the sale of bonds issued by Maryland for stock subscrip-
tions. The committee argued that the manner in which the sale 
was handled cost the company a substantial amount of money. 
As a result, the stockholders removed the company president, 
 treasurer, and directors from office and replaced them with a 
new slate of corporate officers. 
At the August 1841 stockholders meeting, the committee, 
 after further review of the company records, presented addi-
tional problems with the records. The committee made the ob-
servation that several irregularities in vouchers were traced to a 
disregard of company policy by the former company president. 
The committee also stated that during the five months leading 
up to the change in officers, no accounting entries had been en-
tered in the company books. 
In 1845, the review committee made the following observa-
tion about the company’s method of bookkeeping and requested 
that it be changed [C&O, 1842-1846, pp. 488-489]:
They find that under the directions given to the treasur-
er, and in accordance with the custom, which has here-
tofore prevailed in the company, payments have been 
made for more than one purpose on the same warrant 
and the whole payment charged under the head of the 
principal item for which the warrant was drawn.
 In consequence of this circumstance the abstract of 
receipts into and payments from the treasury instead of 
exhibiting the actual condition of the affairs of the com-
pany in its items as well as in its final balances, only 
show the amount charged in the treasurer’s books under 
each head in the abstract instead of the whole amount 
of expenses properly chargeable under that head. Thus 
under the head of pay of lockkeepers, it appears by ab-
stract that the amount paid in 1845 was $627, whereas 
by reference to the accounts of the company it is found 
that the whole amount properly chargeable under this 
head is $7,801.00.
In 1855, the corporate office staff was fired and replaced 
with political appointees. The 1856 review committee disagreed 
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with these organizational changes and stated so in their report 
to the stockholders. The review committee further averred in 
their report that the office staffers who had been fired were com-
petent individuals and that their replacements were incompe-
tent. In 1856, a new slate of corporate officers had been elected 
the prior year. The new corporate officers reinstated the former 
office staff and organization. The 1857 review committee com-
mented that they were grateful to see the former organization of 
corporate officers restored. 
After the canal construction was completed to Cumberland, 
Maryland in 1850, the review committee was less involved in 
reviewing the actions of the president and directors and more 
concerned with the review of the company finances. Subsequent 
to 1857, the review committee made no further admonishing 
remarks about the company operations or finances.5 
Political Problems: As previously noted, the C&O became a po-
litically controlled company. In this political environment, there 
existed the potential for political favors to override the stock-
holder reviews. In 1829, the stockholders established the process 
for the selection of committee members. The stockholder resolu-
tion stated that the review committee would be staffed with a 
representative from Virginia, Maryland, the U.S., and the cities 
of Alexandria, Washington, and Georgetown, each of which had 
purchased large blocks of stock in the company. The balance 
of the committee would include members selected from other 
stockholders in attendance. 
This stockholder audit practice continued until the com-
pany ceased to exist in 1889. During the last 30 years of the 
company’s existence, no review committee reported any error or 
misstatement. 
In the 1881 bondholder lawsuit, the verdict provided stated 
that there were excessive expenditures for travel and entertain-
ment but that the company should not be placed into receiver-
ship. For these reasons, one is left to assume that the review 
committee examined transactions to insure that the transactions 
were correctly documented. It appears that the committee did 
not consider the transactions to determine the legitimacy of the 
expenses. A statement made by the review committee in 1837 
further illustrated this point. The committee reported that the 
magnitude of expenses paid and charged to the contingent fund 
5 An examination by the authors of the review committee reports subsequent 
to 1857 found no additional admonishing comment about the company. 
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(miscellaneous expense) far exceeded that of the previous year. 
After presenting the transactions that represented the greatest 
amount of these expenses, the committee made the comment 
that they were not charged with testing the legitimacy of the 
payments and, therefore, had no opinion to render regarding the 
necessity of the payments made. They further commented that 
the payments were authorized by the board [C&O, 1836-1841, 
p. 130]. This denial illustrates the shortcoming of the C&O’s re-
view committee’s practice. 
The practices of the review committee had the shortcom-
ing of not identifying problems relating to the magnitude of 
expenditures, but the committees did reveal and recommend 
changes in internal control and company reporting practices. 
The individuals performing these financial reviews were not 
trained  auditors, but they were still able to recognize problems 
and recommend changes which the corporate officers placed 
into service.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVOLUTION
The model of corporate governance that existed at C&O was 
similar to other corporations during that era and beyond. Theo-
retically over time, capital-market investors required a reason-
able accounting for the use of their capital. For example, in early 
19th century development companies, such as the PC, individual 
investors were directly involved in both the supply of capital and 
in the management of companies. Corporate governance tech-
niques for several of these early companies included assurance 
in the charter of the publication of an annual report and the 
agreement among selected shareholders to serve as members of 
an audit committee [Russ et al., 2006]. 
Railroads and later larger corporate entities drew from an 
expanding capital market made possible by communication im-
provements, such as the telegraph which linked cities and capi-
tal investors. Thus, individual and merchants served as “bank-
ers” of investment funds. Interstate investment required the use 
of legal vehicles such as “trusts” to assure that accountabilities 
and “reasonable” control of information could be achieved. In 
the last quarter of the 19th century, industrial expansion, abet-
ted by the creation of corporate holding companies and the 
rise of investment banking houses such as Morgan and Schiff, 
produced a greater concentration of funds and greater public 
concern regarding the management of those funds. 
In states such as Massachusetts, the response was to form 
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public railroad commissions, headed by leading citizens such as 
Charles Frances Adams of the famous presidential family.  Adams 
and his brother Henry also introduced public commentary by 
writing about the abuses of corporate railroad management, 
such as their essay on the Erie Railroad and the alleged ma-
nipulations of this laissez faire era attributed to Gould, Fisk, and 
Drew. Public concerns were addressed, in part, by the notion of 
“disclosure” being required of transportation companies which 
operated interstate. The Massachusetts Commission, known as 
the Sunshine Commission, became the model for the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, established in 1887, which required the 
filing of information about the operations of carriers.
A new accounting profession launched with the passage of 
the CPA designation in l896 spread across the country in the 
next three decades. Disclosure, exemplified in the reports of U.S. 
Steel, sought to address public concern, and journalists paid 
extensive attention to corporate abuse. Collectively, these efforts 
were the response to public and private concerns that capital 
providers be given a reasonable accounting about the use of 
their capital.
The notion of boards of directors serving as the ultimate 
manager of corporations and representing individual owners, 
community members, merchant bankers, and capital provid-
ers while countering the power of professional management, 
became the mode as corporations in transportation and industry 
continued to grow in economic importance. 
Chandler [1977] documents the rise of a professional man-
agement class in the early 20th century, describing how their 
power to allocate resources constituted a “visible hand” that 
often, if not effectively, replaced Smith’s “invisible hand.” With 
this era came a loss of proprietary involvement in major corpo-
rations and a rise of contractual management and investor rela-
tionships which can be called the “agency era” as documented 
by Berle and Means [l932].
Berle and Means’ work began a modern era of public con-
cern over the relationships among capital providers, proprietors, 
and managers, well documented in the writings of Shleifer and 
Vishny [1997]. From the beginning of the 19th century through 
the rise of agency governance concerns, a core theoretical con-
cern remained to provide for a reasonable accounting for the 
use of their capital. During this time period, the corporate gov-
ernance structure remained essentially the same. The greatest 
change over the 200 years of history was the increasing distance 
between the stockholders and management. 
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SARBANES OXLEY
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in response to corporate failures including, most prominently, 
Enron and WorldCom. SOX was designed to, among other 
things, strengthen corporate governance. While SOX has made 
some statutory changes to our corporate governance system 
and strengthened the board of directors, issues still remain. 
SOX does not eliminate the agency problem of corporate man-
agement, but it does make corporate management criminally 
liable for corporate reporting. Individual stockholders are still 
unable to exert control over the companies that they own, while 
large stockholders are not required to monitor the companies in 
which they hold stock. SOX has made improvements, but there 
is still much room for corporate governance issues to arise. 
It will take time before it can be known if SOX has had an 
effect on corporate governance today. In the case of the C&O, 
there are some areas where SOX could have made a difference. 
In the later years of the company, the stockholder review com-
mittee did the job and made no comments. The largest corpo-
rate governance failure at the C&O appears to have been during 
the 1870s when President Gorman ran the company to feather 
his own nest as much as to enhance the well-being of the com-
pany. Gorman was elected to the U.S. Senate while serving as 
president of the company. The corporate bondholders sued the 
company in 1881, alleging that the company was being used to 
further his political ambitions. The corporate responsibility sec-
tion of SOX requires company management to be held respon-
sible for the company’s financial statements. No one questioned 
the financial statements of the C&O; however, the bondholders 
did question the financial management of the company. If SOX 
had been in place in the 1870s, it could have encouraged the 
directors to a greater diligence in policing the expenditures of 
President Gorman.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Corporate governance as it existed in the early 19th century 
has not changed significantly from what exists today. While the 
distance between stockholders and management has increased 
over time, corporations have always been faced with managing 
absentee ownership and the related concerns surrounding the 
provision of proper assurance and disclosure.
This paper provides support for the theoretical framework 
of corporate governance presented by Hart [1995] by presenting 
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evidence from a 19th century company. In this regard, the issues 
presented by Hart are not considered new, but were manifested 
and were acted upon in an early corporation. In this paper, a 
“modern” theory was applied to a 19th century company. A 
theory of this nature, or any other theory, should stand the tests 
of time, tested by both contemporary and historical data. If 
the concept stands up to the tests of time, then it gains in ac-
ceptance; when it fails the tests of time, it loses acceptance. Are 
matters relating to 19th governance comparable to the modern 
era? Theoretically, they are the same issues. The first corpora-
tions struggled with the idea of absentee ownership as corpora-
tions do today. The example used in this paper is of a company 
struggling to develop a corporate governance system that would 
be taken for granted today. The founders of this company did 
not have a roadmap to follow in starting the corporation. The 
PC/C&O was one of the first American corporations. 
In summary, Hart states that agent contracts cannot be 
comprehensively written. The C&O did not have an employment 
contract with the president of the company. The stockholders 
controlled the president’s actions by resolutions made at the an-
nual stockholders meetings. As new issues arose, the stockhold-
ers adopted new resolutions to restrict or control the president. 
Second, Hart felt that when individual stockholders are too 
numerous, a failure to exert control over the actions of corpo-
rate officers exists. In the late 1700s, the PC/C&O established 
a corporate governance structure similar in many ways to the 
structure used today. One difference between the C&O’s and 
modern structures is the use of independent auditors to review 
the finances of the company today. The C&O used a committee 
consisting of stockholders to perform the audit function and to 
review the actions of the president and Board of Directors. 
Third, Hart contended that large stockholders will “free 
ride” instead of actively participate in the monitoring of corpo-
rate management. In the case of the C&O’s largest stockholder, 
Maryland, participation in corporate management was no 
greater than the participation of other stockholders, even with 
Maryland’s much larger investment to protect. The state not only 
failed to monitor at a level associated with the investment at 
risk but allowed company management to pursue political gains 
at the company’s expense. President Gorman was accused of 
using the company to further his own political career. In the 
lawsuit brought by a bondholder alleging mismanagement, the 
court did not find mismanagement but found only that the com-
pany was spending unnecessary money. The court did not give 
21
Russ et al.: Corporate governance in the 19th century: Evidence from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company
Published by eGrove, 2009
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2009134
control to the bondholders but did appoint a court monitor to 
review future company spending. 
Next, Hart [1995] presented four limitations of a board of 
directors. This paper provides support for three of the four limi-
tations: board members may not have a financial interest in the 
company, board members have little time for company affairs, 
and directors may owe their position to company management. 
After Maryland gained controlling interest of the company, the 
C&O Boards of Directors were selected based on political party 
affiliation rather than for business reasons. Each subsequent 
change in the majority political party in the statehouse resulted 
in a new president and Board of Directors. For this reason, the 
board members were not stockholders and had no financial in-
terest in the success of the company. The board was more loyal 
to the company president (a fellow political appointee) than to 
the company stockholders. The actions of the board, while not 
explored in this paper, were probably more politically than profit 
motivated for the reasons set forth above. 
The last corporate governance issue presented by Hart 
is that the potential exists for managers to pursue their own 
in terest at the expense of the company. In his paper describ-
ing  Arthur Gorman as a political party boss, Sanderlin [1947] 
observed that Gorman used his position as president of the 
C&O for his own political gain. The 1881 bondholder petition 
provides additional support for the case that the presidents of 
the C&O used the office for political purposes. As stated, it is felt 
that Gorman used his position as the company president to as-
sist in his election to the U.S. Senate [Sanderlin 1947]. 
Shleifer and Vishny [1997] write that most advanced market 
economies have reasonably solved the problem of corporate 
governance, but this does not mean that the current systems 
of corporate governance cannot be improved. The issues raised 
by Hart indicate weaknesses in the corporate governance struc-
ture used today. Examples of today’s corporate failures provide 
evidence that improvements could and should be made. In the 
U.S., more requirements are being made for outside directors 
to strengthen corporate governance. Maybe we can learn from 
history and find additional solutions to corporate governance 
problems that have been lost in time. In the U.S., the distance 
between managers and providers of capital increases the agency 
problem [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. Managers have greater dis-
cretionary power over the allocation of corporate resources than 
might otherwise be the case if owners were actively involved in 
corporate affairs. 
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In the case of the C&O, the stockholder review committee 
gave the providers of capital, the stockholders, a more active 
involvement in corporate management. Since companies that 
draw on the experience of the stockholders will be more efficient 
[O’Sullivan 2000], the model of a stockholder review committee 
utilized by the C&O might well be utilized in corporate gover-
nance today. 
REFERENCES
Berle, A.A. and Means, G.C. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(New York: Macmillan).
Chandler, A.D., Jr. (1977), The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in Ameri-
can Business (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).
Charkham, J. (1994), Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance 
in Five  Countries (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (1828-1835), The Minutes of the Proceed-
ings of the Subscribers to the Capital Stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
Company, Vol. A.
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (1836-1841), The Minutes of the Proceed-
ings of the Subscribers to the Capital Stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
Company, Vol. B. 
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (1842-1846), The Minutes of the Proceed-
ings of the  Subscribers to the Capital Stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
Company, Vol. C.
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (1856-1889), The Minutes of the Proceed-
ings of the  Subscribers to the Capital Stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
Company, Vol. E.
Dilts, J.D. (1993), The Great Road (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Gallhofer, S. and Haslam, J. (1993), “Approaching Corporate Accountability: 
Fragments from the Past,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 23, No. 
91A: 320-330.
Hart, O. (1995), “Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications,” Eco-
nomic Journal,  Vol. 105, No. 430: 678-689.
Kistler, L.H. (1980), “The Middlesex Canal – An Analysis of its Accounting and 
Management,” Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1: 43-57.
Lambert, J.R. (1953), Arthur Pue Gorman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer-
sity Press).
O’Sullivan, M. (2000), “The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance,” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, No. 4: 393-416.
Ransom, R.L. (1964), “Canals and Development: A Discussion of the Issues,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 54, No. 3: 365-376.
Roberts, C. (1938), The Middlesex Canal 1793-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press).
Roe, M. (1993), “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, 
and the United States,” Yale Law Review, Vol. 102: 1,927-2,003.
Russ, R., Previts, G.J., and Coffman, E.N. (2006), “ The Stockholder Review 
Committee of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, 1828-1857: Evi-
dence of Changes in Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance,” Ac-
counting Historians Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1: 125-143.
23
Russ et al.: Corporate governance in the 19th century: Evidence from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company
Published by eGrove, 2009
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2009136
Sanderlin, W.S. (1946), The Great National Project (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Publishing).
Sanderlin, W.S. (1947), “Arthur P. Gorman and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal: 
An Episode in the Rise of a Political Boss,” Journal of Southern History, Vol. 
13, No. 3: 323-337.
Shaw, R.E. (1966), Erie Water West (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press).
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Jour-
nal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2: 737-783.
Stewart v. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. and Others, Circuit Court. 5 F. 149 
(1881).
Virginia Act (1784), An Act for Opening and Extending the Navigation of Poto-
mack River.
Wilner, A.M. (1984), The Maryland Board of Public Works (Annapolis: Hall of Re-
cords Commission, Department of General Services).
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9
137Russ et al., The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company
APPENDIX 1
List and Location of Annual Reports for the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Canal Company for the Period of this Study: 
1829-1889
Number Year Location Number Year Location
1 1829* Library of VA 31 1859 UVA
2 1830 Library of VA 32 1860 UVA
3 1831 Library of VA 33 1861 MD Law Library
4 1832 Library of VA 34 1862 MD Law Library
5 1833 Library of VA 35 1863 MD Law Library
6 1834 Library of VA 36 1864 UVA
7 1835 Library of VA 37 1865 MD Law Library
8 1836 Library of VA 38 1866 NARA
9 1837 Library of VA 39 1867 UVA
10 1838 Library of VA 40 1868 UVA
11 1839 Library of VA 41 1869 Report not located
12 1840 MD Law Library 42 1870 U Mich
13 1841 MD Law Library 43 1871 MD Law Library
14 1842 MD Law Library 44 1872 MD Law Library
15 1843 Library of VA 45 1873 MD Law Library
16 1844 MD Law Library 46 1874 MD Law Library
17 1845 MD Law Library 47 1875 MD Law Library
18 1846 MD Law Library 48 1876 Madison
19 1847 MD Law Library 49 1877 MD Law Library
20 1848 MD Law Library 50 1878 Madison
21 1849 MD Law Library 51 1879 MD Law Library
22 1850 MD Law Library 52 1880 Madison
23 1851 MD Law Library 53 1881 Madison
24 1852 MD Law Library 54 1882 Madison
25 1853 MD Law Library 55 1883 Madison
26 1854 UVA 56 1884 Madison
27 1855 MD Law Library 57 1885 Madison
28 1856 UVA 58 1886 MD Law Library
29 1857 Report not located 59 1887 Madison
30 1858 UVA 60 1888 Report not located
61 1889 NARA
NARA: National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
MD Law Library: Maryland State Law Library, Annapolis, Maryland
Library of VA: The Library of Virginia, Richmond Virginia
UVA: The University of Virginia Library
Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society
U Mich: University of Michigan
* The C&O broke ground in 1828, and the first annual report was presented at the 
end of the first year of operations in 1829. 
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